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ABSTRACT
We take the view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate
law. Despite corporate scholars’ nearly exclusive focus on corporate law mechanisms
for controlling managerial agency costs, shareholders are not the only constituency
concerned with such costs. Given the thick web of firms’ contractual commitments, it
should not be a surprise that other financial claimants may also attempt to control
agency costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring
by other claimants has value for shareholders.
We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of the value of cross-monitoring.
Our approach builds on prior empirical work on the value of good corporate
governance, to which we add data on the presence of bank loans and their interactions
with free cash flow, governance indices, and individual corporate governance
provisions. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to measure the performance
effects of bank debt as a device for reducing managerial agency costs, and the first
study on the interaction of ongoing bank monitoring with corporate governance
arrangements. We find strong evidence that bank monitoring adds value. In effect,
bank monitoring can counteract somewhat the value-decreasing effects of managerial
entrenchment. Bank monitoring may substitute for good corporate governance.
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CROSS-MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
JOANNA M. SHEPHERD,* FREDERICK TUNG,** AND ALBERT H. YOON***
INTRODUCTION
Corporate law scholars have long assumed that corporate law does and should take
the laboring oar for improving firm value and shareholder returns for public companies.
On this view, strategies for agency cost reduction focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the
internal corporate governance institutions that structure relations between firm managers
and shareholders.

But shareholders are not the only constituency concerned with

managerial agency costs. Given the thick web of firms’ contractual commitments, it
should not be surprising that other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency
costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring by other
claimants has value for shareholders. We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of
the value of cross-monitoring.
Our paper marries two strands of literature—the empirical corporate governance
literature and the corporate finance literature—to investigate the effect of bank monitoring
on corporate performance. A number of scholars have begun to test empirically the valuecreating effects of various corporate governance features. Gompers, Ishii, and Metric
(GIM) (2003) first proposed a corporate governance index, the G-index, to capture the
degree of managerial control versus shareholder rights embedded in firms’ corporate
governance structures.

For this index, GIM identify twenty-four separate corporate

governance features of interest that might together or in certain combinations affect firm
value and shareholder returns. They score public companies based on the number of
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
*** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Professor of Political
Science, Northwestern University (by courtesy).
For helpful comments, we owe thanks to Scott Baker, Bernie Black, Bill
Henderson, John Pottow, and Bob Rasmussen, as well as workshop participants at the
University of Michigan Law School, the Florida State University College of Law, the
Canadian Law and Economics Association 2006 Annual Meeting, the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools 2006 Annual Meeting, and the Law and Society Association
2006 Annual Meeting.
**

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914229

CROSS-MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
governance features each firm has in place that increase managerial control and
correspondingly reduce shareholder rights, and they perform a number of empirical tests to
determine whether governance affects firm value or corporate performance. From the
G-index, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (BCF) (2005) devised their E-index, identifying six
specific corporate governance variables that appear to have the strongest correlation with
firm value.

Like GIM, BCF use their index to score firms based on the degree of

managerial entrenchment. Other empirical studies have devised and tested other corporate
governance indices (see Brown and Caylor 2004; Black, Jang, and Kim 2006).
Largely apart from this shareholder-focused corporate governance literature,
finance scholars have pursued another line of research exploring financial intermediation
and its externalities that might affect other financial claimants (see Datta, Iskandar-Datta,
and Patel 1999; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005). Of special interest to us, several
studies have confirmed that the announcement of a bank loan benefits the borrower firm’s
stockholders.

Event studies have consistently found abnormal stock price returns to

borrower firms upon the public announcement of bank loans (see James 1987; Slovin,
Johnson, and Glascock 1992; Best and Zhang 1993; Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995;
Hadlock and James 2002). Two standard theoretical explanations for this stock price effect
have emerged, neither of which excludes the other. First, bank lenders may obtain private
information about the firm during the process of negotiating the lending arrangement.
Consummation of a loan agreement conveys positive private information to the market
concerning the firm’s value. The second explanation is that banks perform a monitoring
function not otherwise available, and this monitoring improves firm value.
Previous studies of bank loan effects have typically relied on event studies of stock
price reactions to bank loan announcements. Despite the findings of these studies and the
evolving empirical focus on corporate governance, to date no one has attempted to measure
performance effects of bank debt (or other of the firm’s contractual arrangements) that
might include mechanisms for managerial agency cost reduction. No study has attempted
to investigate the interaction of ongoing bank monitoring with corporate governance
arrangements.

We hypothesize that if bank monitoring explains at least part of the

observed positive market reaction to bank loan announcements, then we should also
2
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observe improved corporate performance as a result of bank monitoring.1

Bank

monitoring may enhance firm value. We believe that over a wide range of situations, the
interests of lenders and equity holders converge in reducing managerial agency costs. We
also expect that bank monitoring may interact with certain corporate governance features.
We adopt the basic empirical framework used by GIM and BCF to study the impact of
bank monitoring on corporate performance.
Corporate law scholars have generally not looked much beyond corporate law and
markets for mechanisms to reduce agency costs. Law scholars have not much discussed
the possibility that creditor monitoring might improve public company firm value.2
Triantis and Daniels (1995) were among the first to suggest that bank monitoring might
benefit a firm’s claimants generally. They proposed an interactive theory of corporate
governance, arguing that stakeholders’ exit decisions provide valuable information to one
another, thereby enhancing stakeholders’ collective ability to discipline management. A
decade later, Baird and Rasmussen (2006) have renewed the focus on creditor monitoring
and corporate governance, describing creditor control as the “missing lever” in the
corporate governance literature. Aside from these thoughtful discussions, however, the
potential for creditor governance has been ignored in the corporate law literature.
Moreover, these few existing papers focus primarily on the downside—creditors’ ability to
affect corporate governance once the firm is in distress. Our claim is broader. We believe
bank monitoring has more general value for firms even outside the narrow distress context.
The dearth of attention from corporate scholars is somewhat ironic given the
ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation and the thick web of contractual

1

Several studies suggest that non-bank private debt may also bring bank-like benefits to
equity holders. Preece and Mullineaux (1994) and Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995)
show a positive stock price reaction to announcements of non-bank private debt
placements, with no statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus nonbank private debt. Our data identify only bank debt, however. Other forms of private
debt—loans made by non-bank entities like insurance companies and commercial finance
companies, for example—are not included.
2 Law scholars have extensively analyzed the role of banks in the governance of small
firms (Scott 1986).
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commitments that bind the public company. Stockholders are not the only claimants on
the firm that might be concerned about agency costs. Finance theorists noted long ago the
various agency costs that different financial claims may create. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that financial claimants may attempt to control agency costs in their contracts
with firms. And while finance theorists often emphasize the conflicting interests among
different types of financial claims,3 surely debt and equity must share some interest in
reducing managerial slack. Cross-monitoring must have some value.
In a word, corporate governance may involve more than corporate law.

We

investigate bank debt to see whether this might be true. Following GIM and BCF, we use
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as our measure of firm value. We find strong evidence that
bank monitoring adds value, especially where agency costs are high. In effect, bank
monitoring may substitute for good corporate governance.
In general, controlling for governance indices and for potential simultaneity, we
find a positive and significant relation between firm value and the presence of a bank loan.
In addition, using measures of free cash flow to differentiate companies with high agency
costs, we find that bank monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm value,
and that this effect is greater for firms with substantial free cash flow. Finally, we offer
evidence that bank monitoring may counteract somewhat the value-decreasing effect of
managerial entrenchment. We test interactions among our loan indicator, free cash flow,
and measures of governance quality, namely (i) the G-index; (ii) the E-index; and
(iii) individual E-index entrenchment provisions. We show first, that for a given quality of
corporate governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring improves firm
value. Second, we differentiate among E-index provisions, showing that bank monitoring
may matter most when strong entrenchment would otherwise encourage managers to
squander free cash—i.e., when agency costs are high.

3

For the seminal work in this regard, see Jensen and Meckling (1976), modeling the
agency cost of debt as increasing in the percentage of outside financing comprised of debt
versus equity.
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Part I of this Article reviews the relevant corporate governance and corporate
finance literature. Part II elaborates our monitoring hypothesis and discusses potential
challenges to it. Part III describes the data and outlines our methodology. Part IV
discusses our findings. Part V concludes.
I.
THE STATE OF THE ART:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DOES NOT MEET CORPORATE FINANCE
This Part briefly reviews the separate literatures on corporate governance and
corporate finance, primarily the empirical literature. As described below, these two strands
of research have developed largely in isolation from one another.
A.

Corporate Governance through Corporate Law

For decades, corporate scholars in the dominant shareholder-centric tradition
argued over optimal corporate governance provisions for public companies. Especially
with the takeover boom in the 1980s, scholars wrestled with fundamental theoretical
questions concerning the internal governance arrangements that might best realize value
for shareholders. That theoretical debate has continued to the present.
Corporate law scholars often note the absence of strong internal monitoring of
corporate managers. Some find this lamentable; others find it comforting. Scholars in the
former camp call for more independent directors or more stringent definitions of director
independence or stronger shareholder rights (Bebchuk 2005; Bebchuk 2006) or even
paternalistic federal screening and monitoring of corporate managers (Fanto 2006).
Scholars in the latter camp note the unavoidable trade off between internal monitoring and
effective decision making.4

They point out the numerous external disciplining

mechanisms that force managers to be true to investor interests. Product markets and
markets for corporate control and managerial talent all combine to reduce managerial
agency costs.
Complementing the theory, scholars have recently attempted to measure the value
of corporate law and various corporate governance features, generally relying on stock
market-based metrics. Daines and Subramanian have each attempted to measure the value

5
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of Delaware corporate law, using Tobin’s Q as their metric (Daines 2001; Subramanian
2004). Others have investigated the effects of specific corporate governance provisions on
stock prices (Lambert and Larker 1985; Ryngaert 1988).
Then GIM (2003) devised their G-index, rating companies based on the degree of
management entrenchment as indicated by twenty-four separate corporate governance
features tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The G-index
tracks, among other things, governance provisions allowing managers to delay hostile
bidders, provisions on shareholder voting, director-officer protections, and other takeover
defenses.

GIM find a significant inverse correlation between firm performance and

management entrenchment, using Tobin’s Q and stock returns as their dependent variables.
Other corporate governance studies relying on the G-index followed (Cremers and Nair
2005; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005). BCF (2005) refined the GIM approach. Instead
of canvassing the entire range of IRRC corporate governance items, BCF focus on six they
claim to be the most significant in terms of management entrenchment. These six—
staggered boards, limits to bylaw amendments, limits to charter amendments,
supermajority voting for mergers, golden parachutes, and poison pills—form their Eindex.5 Like GIM, BCF find a significant inverse correlation between their E-index and
performance. Other indices have also emerged. Brown and Caylor (2004) developed their
fifty-one factor Gov-Score index, which purports to improve on the G-index in explaining
firm performance. Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) similarly create a corporate governance
index for Korean companies, again showing a strong association between corporate
governance and firm value.
Most recently, Core, Guay and Rusticus (CGR) (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton
(2006) present surprising findings suggesting some skepticism as to the value of good
governance.

CGR find that in the 1990s, stock returns of companies with strong

shareholder rights did not outperform those with weak shareholder rights. Bhagat and

4

Bainbridge (2002) has posed the dilemma as “accountability versus authority.”
Each firm’s E-index for a given year is simply the number of E-index entrenchment
mechanisms the firm has in place in that year.

5
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Bolton find that good governance—as measured by the G-index, the E-index, stock
ownership of board members, and the separation of CEO and chair—is significantly and
positively correlated with operating performance—according to accounting measures—but
is not correlated with future stock performance, contrary to GIM and BCF. In addition,
Bhagat and Bolton find a negative correlation between board independence and operating
performance.
B.

Corporate Finance and Bank Monitoring

Implicit in the empirical corporate governance scholarship is the assumption that
the legal rules and contracts structuring relations among firm managers and shareholders
supply the primary governance mechanisms affecting managerial performance, stock
returns, and firm value. The corporate finance literature, on the other hand, has focused on
financial intermediation and the benefits of cross-monitoring. The development of this
literature has been largely independent from the corporate governance literature.6
The monitoring role of banks has been a common focus in the literature. The
theoretical case for banks’ special monitoring ability has been modeled extensively
(Campbell and Kracaw 1980; Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Fama
1985). Empirical testing of this proposition has generally taken the form of event studies
showing positive stock market reactions to bank loan announcements (James 1987; Billett,
Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995; Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock 1992; Best and Zhang 1993).
These studies confirm that banks’ extensions of credit are generally good news for
stockholders of the borrower firm.
Two theoretical accounts have been offered to explain this good news.

The

positive stock price reaction may reflect the value of future bank monitoring during the life
of the loan. Or instead, the bank’s initial lending decision may itself create a positive
market reaction by resolving information asymmetry for the market. The bank obtains
private information about the firm during its diligence process when deciding to lend. Its
lending decision may therefore convey positive private information concerning the firm’s

6

One exception is Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005.
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creditworthiness or the value of its projects (Myers and Majluf 1984; Mikkelson and
Partch 1986; James 1987).7 These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and studies
tend to confirm that both information asymmetry and monitoring theories may help explain
the market’s positive reaction. We discuss empirical validation of the monitoring theory
more fully below.
As for information asymmetry, the findings of Best and Zhang (1993) support this
notion that an extension of bank credit conveys positive private information about the firm.
Using financial analysts’ percentage earnings forecast errors as a proxy for information
asymmetry, they show that firms with high forecast errors enjoy significant positive stock
price reactions to bank loan announcements, while firms with low forecast errors do not.
Along similar lines, Hadlock and James (2002) investigate public companies’ marginal
financing decisions. They confirm the positive abnormal stock returns that accompany
bank loan announcements, which are both statistically significant and also significantly
different from the negative abnormal returns accompanying announcements of public
issues of common stock and straight debt. In addition, they find that firms choosing bank
debt have higher stock return volatility and higher analyst forecast errors than firms issuing
public securities, which is consistent with the notion that information asymmetry and
adverse selection costs drive firms to choose bank debt.

7

Lummer and McConnell (1989) distinguish between new bank loans and loan renewals.
They find excess stock returns only around the announcement of loan renewals, but not
new loans, which suggests that banks provide a credible signal of firm value only as a
result of a continuing lending relationship with a borrower firm. This result also tends to
contradict any monitoring hypothesis, since the market would appear not to attribute
positive value to any prospective bank monitoring of new loans. However, subsequent
research has not supported Lummer and McConnell’s claimed distinction between new
loans and renewals.
Controlling for differences in other borrower and lender
characteristics, such as precision of analyst earnings forecasts and lender credit quality,
both Best & Zhang (1993) and Billett, Flannery, & Garfinkel (1995) find no statistically
significant difference in stock price reaction to announcements of new loans versus
renewals.
8
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We take the lessons from the corporate finance literature on bank monitoring and
connect them with the empirical corporate governance literature to show the beneficial
effects of bank monitoring on firm value.
II.

OUR HYPOTHESES

Despite the evolving empirical focus on corporate governance, to date no one has
attempted to measure performance effects of bank debt, which typically include agency
cost reduction devices. No study has attempted to investigate the interaction of ongoing
bank monitoring with corporate governance. We hypothesize that bank monitoring may
enhance firm value. We believe that over a wide range of situations, the interests of
lenders and equity holders converge in reducing managerial agency costs. We therefore
hypothesize a general salutary effect of bank monitoring on firm value. Moreover, we
expect bank monitoring to matter most when agency costs are high. We proxy high
agency costs with measures of free cash flow and managerial entrenchment. This Part
elaborates our bank monitoring hypotheses and discusses potential challenges to it.
A.

Bank Monitoring and Agency Costs

In this section, we first describe banks’ monitoring advantage and its
implementation. We then explain our use of free cash flow and management entrenchment
measures to identify when bank monitoring may be most beneficial.
1.

Bank Monitoring

Banks enjoy important institutional advantages as monitors.

Banks tend to

specialize in lending to particular industries or regions, giving them exceptional
background knowledge with which to assess performance of individual borrowers. Banks
also typically lend on a short-term or medium-term basis in order to match their assets with
their mostly short-term deposit liabilities.

This short time horizon forces borrowers

periodically to return to the bank or other capital providers for renewed financing.
Renewal with the lending bank offers the bank a new opportunity to garner information
about the borrower and to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness (Fama 1985). More
generally, regardless of whether the borrower firm ultimately renews with its bank lender
or turns to new financing sources, the continuing specter of an impending assessment by
the capital markets—with the required disclosure by the borrower and diligence by
9
DRAFT April 27, 2007

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914229

CROSS-MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
prospective capital providers—may tend to keep borrower management in line during the
life of the bank loan.
How does bank monitoring operate to control agency costs? The standard credit
agreement imposes numerous specific restrictions and obligations on the borrower firm
regarding operational matters and its financial condition.8

The bank also demands a

regular flow of information concerning the borrower’s financial and operating performance
in the form of periodic and special reporting requirements, as detailed below. Finally, the
bank often enjoys access to the borrower’s officers, directors, employees, and outside
accountants to discuss the borrower’s affairs, a privilege not available to the typical
shareholder. Moreover, because the bank bears a duty of confidentiality with respect to
borrower information, the bank generally enjoys better access to information than is
publicly available (Benston and Smith 1976).
As far as operational constraints, negative covenants prohibit many types of
transactions without the bank’s consent. For example, the firm’s use of loan proceeds is
restricted. Its latitude to incur new debt, make investments or distributions, engage in
transactions with affiliates, sell substantial assets, give liens on its assets, merge, or change
the nature of its business, may all be explicitly restricted in the loan agreement. Nini,
Smith, and Sufi (2007) show that limits on capital expenditures contained in bank credit
agreements reduce firm investment, and they offer preliminary evidence that these
restrictions are efficient.

They find that both firm value and operating performance

increase in the year after a firm becomes subject to a newly imposed capital expenditure
restriction, suggesting that such restrictions reduce inefficient excess investment by
managers.
Financial covenants also constrain the firm. It must, for example, preserve certain
levels of net worth, tangible assets, total capital relative to debt, and cash flow relative to

8

See, e.g, Form 8-K filed by Staples Inc. (Dec. 20, 2004) (describing 2004 Revolving
Credit Agreement with Bank of America); Form 8-K filed by Stride Rite Corp. (Sep. 22,
2005) (describing revolving credit agreement with Bank of America).
10
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debt service obligations.9 Myriad technical default provisions in the contract enable the
bank to tighten the reins if the firm falters.
To facilitate monitoring of these myriad obligations and restrictions, the bank
requires the borrower to provide a steady stream of information in the form of periodic
financial and operating reports.

With its periodic reports, the firm must certify its

continuing compliance with each specific condition and restriction contained in the credit
agreement. For example, in addition to producing quarterly financial statements, the firm
may be required specifically to certify its net worth, tangible assets, cash flow, and other
financial information in order to confirm its covenant compliance. Besides these regular
reports, the borrower obligates itself to provide notice to the bank of any number of
unfortunate incidents that might adversely affect the borrower’s creditworthiness—
material litigation, a default or potential default, receipt of a government notice of a
material regulatory violation, for example. And as earlier mentioned, the bank typically
enjoys access to the borrower’s management and outside accountants in order to discuss
the borrower’s operational and financial condition.
Finally, in addition to contractual constraints and ongoing reporting, the bank often
also has a representative on the borrower’s board of directors (Krozner and Strahan 2001),
which offers one more avenue for active monitoring.
2.

Free Cash Flow

Free cash flow has been identified as an especially pernicious temptation for
managers, who may “use it to bankroll forms of managerial slack.” (Triantis and Daniels
1995; Jensen 1986). We expect that ceteris paribas, firms with high free cash flow will
benefit most from bank monitoring because of their higher potential agency conflicts.
Bank loan arrangements address this free cash flow problem in several ways. First,
mandatory regular interest and principal payments on the loan reduce the amount of free

9

Bond indentures contain similar provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. U.S.
Timberlands Klamath Falls, L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930 (Del. Ch. 2004). The court’s detailed
technical discussion of note indenture provisions in that case illustrates the thoroughness
and complexity of creditor protections in standard credit arrangements.
11
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cash. Second, bank loans often contain an excess cash covenant, which explicitly limits
the borrower firm’s cash on hand by requiring that any excess be used to pay down the
bank debt. Third, the lender typically requires the borrower firm to maintain its deposit
accounts with the lender. This enables the lender to monitor continuously the firm’s cash
levels and uses of cash. Finally, the bank may take security interests in the firm’s asset,
which further constrains managers’ access to free cash. Because the security arrangement
ordinarily prohibits sale or further hypothecation of the underlying collateral, managers’
disposal of those assets to generate cash is not an option.
These constraints on free cash, along with the web of reporting requirements,
covenant obligations and other restrictions, and explicit bank oversight serve to constrain
overinvestment—viewed by some as the most serious agency problem for investors
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997)—and otherwise control managerial slack.
3.

Management Entrenchment

Entrenchment insulates managers from discipline by shareholders and by the
market for corporate control, thereby encouraging managerial slack. Corporate governance
mechanisms that tend to insulate managers from discipline are numerous, as evidenced by
the various governance indices scholars have devised to measure governance quality.
Among the most potent entrenching devices is the staggered board (Bebchuk, Coates, and
Subramanian 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005). A staggered board is a board whose
directors’ multi-year terms are staggered. For example, only one-third of a firm’s board
seats may be up for election in any given year. This device prevents a hostile acquirer—
even one who succeeds in acquiring a majority of the firm’s stock or obtaining a majority
of the firm’s voting power by proxy—from replacing a majority of the board in any one
annual election. Instead, the acquirer must wait through at least two annual elections.10
This delay in seizing control of the firm discourages proxy fights and other hostile

10

A staggered board is most effective when the firm’s governance arrangements do not
permit shareholders to (a) effect amendments that unstagger the board; (b) increase the
number of board seats and fill them; or (c) remove directors without cause.
12
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takovers. With less to fear from the market for corporate control, managers may be less
diligent in pursuing shareholders’ interests.
As with free cash flow, we expect bank monitoring to be most beneficial when
agency costs are high. Bank monitoring may matter most where managerial entrenchment
is most severe.
B.

Potential Challenges to the Monitoring Explanation

In this section, we address two potential conceptual challenges to our monitoring
explanation. First, as earlier noted, in addition to the monitoring explanation, resolution of
information asymmetry is also a plausible explanation for the positive stock market
reaction to bank loan announcements. So we review the empirical and theoretical literature
supporting the monitoring theory here. The two theories are not mutually exclusive, and
we seek here only to show that bank monitoring offers at least a partial explanation for the
increases in firm value we later observe.

Second, we consider the effects of credit

derivatives and other risk reducing devices available to banks that may diminish their
incentives to monitor.
1.

Moral Hazard or Adverse
Information Asymmetry

Selection?:

Monitoring

versus

Because we use a market-based metric for firm value as our dependent variable—
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q—a preliminary issue arises in trying to interpret observed
increases in Tobin’s Q associated with the presence of bank loans.

A bank loan

announcement may resolve information asymmetry for stock markets. It may tell the
market that the borrower is “bankable”—that it is creditworthy or may have good projects.
Positive stock market reactions to bank loan announcements may also reflect the value to
the firm of bank monitoring. While banks monitor to reduce moral hazard, the firm’s
equity holders may also benefit from the bank’s ability to deter overinvestment by the
firm’s managers.
Because an increase in Q associated with a bank loan is consistent with either
explanation, several of the models in our empirical section look at subsamples of firmyears in an attempt to isolate the monitoring effect. We also examine subsamples of loans
based on their stated purposes, hypothesizing that certain types of loans carry little or no
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benefit to equity markets in terms of resolving information asymmetry. Here we review in
some detail the extant literature on the value of bank monitoring.
James (1987) offers perhaps the first evidence on the value of bank monitoring. He
studies stock price reactions to public announcements of various types of debt financing.
For bank loan announcements, James finds positive and significant stock price reactions.
Distinguishing bank loans by stated purpose, he finds no significant difference in stock
price response to announcements of (a) bank loans used to refinance debt (either existing
bank loans or other debt offerings) and (b) bank loans used for capital expenditure. He
concludes that loan announcement abnormal stock returns cannot be explained solely by an
information asymmetry theory. As interesting, he finds a statistically significant negative
stock price reaction for announcements of private and straight public debt offerings used to
refinance bank loans. This result is consistent with our monitoring story. It does not
support an information asymmetry theory.
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999) find evidence that bank monitoring benefits
bondholders. In their study, the presence of a pre-existing bank loan reduced at-issue yield
spreads for borrower firms’ first public debt offerings by an average of 68 basis points,
which was both statistically and economically significant. As the authors note, this likely
reflects the value of bank monitoring, which reduces moral hazard in a way that
bondholders by themselves cannot.11 By contrast, at the time of the bond issue, the
already-existing bank loan offers no new information to the market, so it would be difficult
to explain the reduced at-issue yield spreads as a product of reduced information
asymmetry from the presence of bank debt.

Moreover, the length of the bank/firm

relationship is also statistically significant and negatively related to at-issue yield spreads,
which is again consistent with the monitoring hypothesis. Datta, et al. explain this result as
11

Booth (1992) has found that the presence of rated public debt reduces bank loan spreads,
suggesting that cross-monitoring benefits run in the other direction as well. However, the
general consensus in the literature is that bank monitoring is superior (Amihud, Garbade,
and Kahan 1999). Important for our purposes as well are the findings Mikkelson and
Partch (1986) and James (1987) that stock market reaction to announcements of public

14
DRAFT April 27, 2007

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914229

CROSS-MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
consistent with Diamond’s (1991) reputation-building hypothesis: firms that borrow and
repay bank debt establish a good credit history, and this reputation has value in public debt
markets, reducing the costs of public debt. However, another plausible explanation may
involve the lender’s reputation. A lengthy bank/firm relationship may signal the bank’s
familiarity with the borrower’s business, thereby improving the bank’s ability to monitor.12
Altman, Gande, & Saunders (2004) use a different event study methodology to
detect the effect of bank monitoring. They examine loan and bond defaults, comparing
trading price reactions around the default date. They find a smaller price reaction for loans
than bonds, suggesting that more precise information is embedded in loan prices because
of banks’ superior ongoing monitoring.
Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) study firms’ mix of public versus
private debt. They find that firms with greater growth prospects—and therefore greater
debt-related moral hazard problems—rely more heavily on private debt than public debt
because of the monitoring benefits of private debt. Greater growth prospects beget higher
moral hazard because of the greater potential for asset substitution and underinvestment.
Actively monitored private debt is therefore cheaper for such firms than public debt.
These studies support our monitoring hypothesis. Our results below confirm this
view.
2.

Risk Reduction and Banks’ Reduced Incentives to Monitor

Another potential challenge to our monitoring hypothesis involves the plethora of
risk reduction devices now available to bank lenders. Banks and other financial claimants
have increasingly more and finer opportunities to transfer risk to third parties. Active

debt offerings is negative or at best nonpositive. So any monitoring benefit of public debt
appears not to accrue to equity holders.
12 Moreover, regarding abnormal borrower stock returns upon bank loan announcements,
Billett, Flannery, & Garfinkel (1995) have shown that the lender’s public debt rating is
positively correlated with higher abnormal borrower stock returns, supporting the general
proposition that lender quality may matter to equity holders.
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secondary loan markets and the ready availability of credit derivatives13 enable banks and
other financial institutions to lay off risk and rebalance their portfolios in response to
changed circumstances.

A bank’s reduced exposure to a particular borrower

correspondingly may reduce the bank’s incentive to monitor that borrower carefully
(Gande and Saunders 2006; Partnoy and Skeel 2006).
While use of these risk spreading devices has become more and more common
among banks and other private lenders, there remain good reasons to expect that banks will
continue to monitor their borrowers. First of all, the lead bank in a syndicate—typically
the holder of the largest portion of the syndicated loan and the principal monitor on behalf
of the bank group—rarely sells its loan. Instead, it typically retains its original loan in
order to maintain its valuable relationships with the borrower firm and the other banks in
the syndicate. And it continues to monitor. Gande and Saunders (2006) show empirically
the importance of the lead bank’s monitoring role in the face of secondary loan trading.
They show a positive and significant relation between the size of the lead bank’s stake in
the syndicated loan and cumulative abnormal stock returns upon the loan’s
announcement.14
Even with devices available to lay off risk, banks’ profit making generally depends
on their taking positions in their borrower firms. A bank is not merely a loan broker. It
gets paid to take risk. Though it may have new tools available to enable it to lend at lower
risk, it still has incentive to monitor given its exposure. Moreover, diversification does not
eliminate lending risk entirely. Loan purchasers and sellers of credit derivatives will have

13

The most popular credit derivative for bank lenders is the credit default swap. It
effectively offers the lender default insurance on specific borrowers. As with conventional
insurance, the insured (here, the lender) pays a premium to the issuer of the swap
agreement, which obligates itself to repay the insured debt (or some portion) to the insured
should the borrower default.
14 Relying on abnormal stock returns event studies, Gande and Saunders (2006) do not
attempt to disaggregate the bank’s role in resolving information asymmetry from its
ongoing monitoring role. However, their results are consistent with the theory that the lead
bank’s stake in the syndicated loan is positively associated with its monitoring incentives.
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some stake in the continuing monitoring of borrowers, the efficacy of which will no doubt
affect the pricing in these risk spreading transactions.
More traditional ex-ante risk reduction devices may also reduce bank monitoring
incentives. A secured lender would generally have lower monitoring incentives than an
unsecured lender to the same firm. We might also expect to see a secured lender doing less
pre-loan diligence than an unsecured lender, so the information content of the secured
lender’s decision to lend may also convey less valuable information to the market than an
unsecured loan. Similarly, loan size or the agent bank’s stake in a loan may matter. Preloan diligence or monitoring for a small exposure is likely to be a less pressing matter for
the lender than the same activities for a large exposure. In theory, then, we would expect
to see higher Q for large unsecured loans than for small secured loans. We do not
incorporate secured status or loan size in our empirical analysis because, even assuming
our theoretical predictions hold, the results would not enable us to distinguish a monitoring
effect from an information asymmetry effect.15
The next Part discusses our data and methodology.
III.
A.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data

Our universe of companies comes from the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) database, which has published seven volumes detailing firms’ corporate
governance provisions between 1990 and 2006. IRRC coverage includes all firms in the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500, all firms named in annual lists of the largest corporations by
Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week, and other firms the IRRC has considered important.
In any publication year, the universe of IRRC firms covers over 90% of total U.S. stock
market capitalization. Like GIM and BCF, we include all IRRC firms in our database
through 2004, except for those with dual-class common stock. Because IRRC volumes are
15

As for loan sales, while they may reduce the lender’s incentive to monitor, the effect of
loan sales on Tobin’s Q may be more complicated. Gande and Saunders (2006) find that
the inception of loan trading has a positive effect on the borrower’s stock price, suggesting
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not published every year, we follow the convention adopted by GIM in treating firms’
governance provisions as unchanged for the period from the last published volume to the
next published volume.
We took firm financial information from Compustat. Company stock data came
from CRSP monthly files. For loan information, we relied on the DealScan database from
Loan Pricing Corporation, a comprehensive commercial loan database covering large and
middle market commercial loans. DealScan contains detailed terms and conditions for
over 147,000 loan and bond transactions dating back to 1982.
B.

Methodology

To study the relationship between bank monitoring and firm value, we use Tobin’s
Q as the measure of firm value. In our definition of Tobin’s Q, we follow Kaplan and
Zingales (1997), GIM (2003), and BCF (2004). According to this specification, Q is the
ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of
assets is equal to the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus
the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. The dependent
variable in our estimations is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q—each firm’s Q minus the
median Q in the firm’s industry in the observation year. We define each firm’s industry by
the firm’s 2-digit primary SIC code.
Our proxy for bank monitoring is an indicator variable that identifies years that
firms had bank loans for all 12 months. As control variables, we included standard
financial controls that previous research has identified as related to Tobin’s Q. Following
GIM (2003), we include the assets of the firm and the age of the firm measured in months.
Following BCF (2004), we include return on assets, capital expenditures on assets,
research and development expenditures, and leverage. We also include year dummies and
firm dummies in the fixed effects regressions.
In most specifications, we rely on GIM’s G-index as a measure of managerial
entrenchment. As an alternative in some specifications, we include BCF’s E-index and its
that the information provided by secondary market trading complements—and not merely
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components as measures of managerial entrenchment. We use these as either controls or
as interaction variables. In some estimations, we also include a measure of free cash flow
as a proxy for managerial agency costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify the tendency
of managers to overinvest or misuse discretionary funds as the greatest agency conflict
between managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986) asserts that free cash flow is the best
measure of these discretionary funds and thus the best proxy for agency conflicts.
Following Lehn and Poulson (1989) and Chi and Lee (2005), our measure of free cash
flow is calculated as operating income minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends,
and common dividends,16 scaled by the book value of the firm’s assets.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of variables included in the estimations. We
present the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of firms. We also divide our sample
into two subsamples—firms that have a bank loan at some point during our sample period
and firms that do not—and present descriptive statistics for these subsamples as well.
IV.

BANK MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE

To explore the relationship between bank monitoring and firm value, we perform
several estimations to determine whether Tobin’s Q increases when firms have bank loans.
The results are shown in Tables 2 through 7. For each specification, we present the results
of estimations both with and without the standard financial controls. All estimations
include year dummy variables.
A.

Bank Loans and Firm Value
1.

Regression Analysis

Table 2 presents the results of pooled OLS regressions (col. A & B) and regressions
with firm fixed effects (col. C & D). In the pooled OLS regressions, the loan indicator
variable has a statistically significant negative relationship with Tobin’s Q, indicating that,
in a standard cross-sectional relationship, firms with loans have lower Tobin’s Q than
firms without loans.

substitutes for—the information traditionally garnered through bank monitoring.
16 This cash flow computation is given by COMPUSTAT item #13 - #15 – (#16 – change
in #35) - #19 - #21.
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However, when we perform the same estimation controlling for unobserved firm
heterogeneity in columns C and D, the loan indicator variable has a statistically significant
positive relationship with Tobin’s Q.17 This result indicates that within each firm, the
presence of a bank loan is associated with higher Tobin’s Q. The substantial difference in
the R-squared statistics between the pooled OLS regressions and the fixed effect
regressions confirms the importance of firm-specific characteristics in explaining the
changes in Tobin’s Q.
Here and in the regressions that follow, our findings likely understate the
monitoring benefits of bank debt because we assume each bank loan and its associated
monitoring continue for the entire term given in the loan contract. Limitations in the data
preclude us from identifying loans repaid before stated maturity or pinpointing when such
early retirements occur. Therefore, we unavoidably count some number of firm-year
observations as bank-monitored when in fact they are not.
2.

Robustness Checks

In Table 3, we present variations of the fixed-effect estimations from Table 2 to test
the robustness of those results. To address concerns about serial correlation in differencein-difference studies (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004), we first present the results
with t-statistics computed from robust standard errors, which allows for heteroskedasticity
(col. A & B). We then present the results with t-statistics computed from standard errors
clustered by industry (col. C & D) and clustered by firm (col. E & F). Finally, we show
the results of fixed-effect estimations that include industry-specific year effects to control
for confounding variables that may be correlated with both obtaining a loan and firm

17

For each of the estimations in Tables 2-7, we also performed estimations without control
variables on the sample of firms in the estimations with full controls (i.e., so that the
samples match). We have no reason to think there is any selection bias as between the
firms for which data are available for the full set of controls and those for which data are
not available. Most of the results are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude when we
run the without-controls regressions on the smaller sample, but occasionally a
previously significant coefficient became insignificant. For brevity’s sake, we do not
report the results.
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performance, such as interest rates or industry risk (col. G & H). The loan indicator
remains statistically significant in all of these estimations.
B.

Exploring Simultaneity, Monitoring, and Alternative Theories

The results from our previous regressions indicate a positive correlation between
the presence of a bank loan and firm value. However, this does not prove our case for the
importance of bank monitoring. First of all, bank loans might not necessarily cause firm
value to increase. Causation might go in the other direction: perhaps firms with higher
Tobin’s Q are simply more likely to seek and obtain bank loans than firms with lower
Tobin’s Q.18

Or perhaps some omitted third variable is responsible for both firms’

obtaining of bank loans and high Tobin’s Q, so that a positive relationship between firm
value and bank loans could exist even if bank loans did not cause firm value to increase.
Second, even if the presence of a bank loan causes an increase in firm value, bank
monitoring may not be the only plausible explanation. The bank’s willingness to lend may
simply convey positive private information to stock markets about the borrower’s
creditworthiness or the strength of its projects. An increase in Tobin’s Q may result
simply from the resolution of information asymmetry for the markets, independent of any
subsequent monitoring by the lender.
We show ultimately that simultaneity is an unlikely explanation for our observed
increases in firm value in the presence of bank loans. In addition, our results below
indicate that at least in part, bank monitoring explains observed increases in firm value.
1.

Simultaneity

Our regressions in Tables 2 and 3 tend to suggest that causation runs in the
direction we think. Pooled OLS regressions for our entire sample (tbl. 2, col. A & B) show

18

Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) find, for example, a significant positive
relation between a firm’s market-to-book ratio and the proportion of its debt that is private
debt. Their measure of market-to-book ratio may be highly correlated with Tobin’s Q,
which would suggest that firms with bank loans may simply have higher adjusted Q even if
bank monitoring had no effect.
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that overall, firms with bank loans have lower Tobin’s Q than firms without. So it does not
appear that firms start with high Tobin’s Q and then get bank loans.
In Table 4 we explore this issue further. We attempt to determine whether, as
between firms with and without bank loans, systematic differences exist that may be
responsible for the positive relationship between loans and firm value. We run regressions
with firm fixed effects for (a) only the firms in our sample that have a loan at some point
during our sample period (the “Loan Firms”) (col. A & B); (b) only the Loan Firms and
only comparing the period before the loan with the period during the loan (col. C & D);
(c) only the Loan Firms and only comparing the loan period with the period following the
loan’s retirement (col. E & F). These three specifications test whether a selection effect is
driving our results. By limiting the analysis only to Loan Firms, we control for other
fundamental differences between Loan Firms and other firms that may be causing a higher
Tobin’s Q. Moreover, if we are able to confirm that Tobin’s Q both increases when firms
get loans and decreases when firms retire loans, we minimize the possibility that an
omitted third variable is responsible both for firms’ obtaining loans and for increases in
Tobin’s Q. It is unlikely that this omitted third variable would suddenly appear when a
loan was obtained—causing a timely increase in Tobin’s Q—and then disappear when a
loan was retired, causing a timely decrease.
We also run firm fixed effects regressions for the entire sample of firms,
controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before each given firm obtains a bank loan (col. G &
H).19 This control variable will capture non-loan factors that may have increased firm
value before the loan period and that would therefore produce a spurious positive
correlation between a bank loan and Tobin’s Q.
For most estimations, and for all of the estimations using the full set of controls, the
loan’s effect on Tobin’s Q is positive and significant, providing strong evidence of a

19

According to our coding convention, a firm’s loan indicator variable is set to 1 only in
years when the firm had a bank loan for all twelve months. Therefore, our control here
operates as to the year that is two years prior to the year that our loan indicator is first
triggered.
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positive relation between bank monitoring and Tobin’s Q. It is therefore unlikely that
simultaneity is responsible for the positive relationship between bank loans and firm value.
2.

Monitoring versus Information Asymmetry Theories

The results in columns E-F and I-J tend to confirm our bank monitoring theory as
well, as we explain below.
The results in columns C and D, comparing the period before the loan with the
period during the loan, are consistent with either a monitoring theory or an information
asymmetry theory. An increase in a firm’s Tobin’s Q during the loan period as compared
to the preceding period may be explained by the market’s initial revaluation of the firm in
light of the new information conveyed by the bank’s lending decision. Or the value added
by bank monitoring over the term of the loan could explain the increase in Q.
However, the results in columns E and F comparing the loan period with the period
after the loan’s retirement seem consistent only with the monitoring theory. The drop in Q
with the loan’s retirement can be explained by the absence of the bank monitor, but it is
not likely a result of any new information revealed by the loan’s retirement—regarding, for
example, the firm’s growth prospects or the promise of its projects. To the extent that
positive information about the firm’s projects is conveyed to the market at the inception of
a bank loan, we have no reason to expect that these good projects and their valueenhancing effects would cease simultaneously with the maturity of the loan.20
Finally, in columns I and J, we run estimations seeking to isolate the potential
monitoring effects of bank loans on firm value. In order to separate a monitoring effect
from an information asymmetry effect—the alternative theoretical explanation for
observed increases in firm value—we measure the effects of only those loans least likely to

20

The suggestion has been made that a loan’s retirement without renewal may signal the
bank’s assessment that the firm lacks good projects. However, it is far more likely that the
firm merely chose alternative financing, probably in the form of public debt, which is
cheaper than private debt above a certain issue size (Krishnaswami, Spindt, and
Subramaniam 1999). As Diamond (1991) theorizes and Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel
(1999) support empirically, firms may borrow in private debt markets until they establish a
good credit history, at which point they turn to cheaper public debt.
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offer new information to the public markets about the firm’s growth prospects or the
quality of its projects. Increases in Tobin’s Q associated with these “weak-information”
loans would offer further evidence supporting a monitoring theory. To identify these
loans, we look to the loan’s primary purpose as indicated in the DealScan database. We
include only loans for working capital, debt repayment, or commercial paper backup
purposes in our set of weak-information loans.21 Working capital loans are typically used
for the short term financing of ordinary course purchases of inventory or other ordinary
course operations. Debt repayment loans simply refinance existing debt. A commercial
paper backup loan is merely a credit enhancement device for companies that issue
commercial paper.22 These types of loans seem to convey no strong positive information
to public markets about the borrower firm’s projects.
We compare the effects of these weak-information loans to firm-years in which
there is no loan. For our models in columns I and J, our sample includes only firm-years
where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s only loan(s) are weak-information
loans. We ignore all other firm-years—i.e., firm-years in which a firm has a loan other
than a weak-information loan. Our fixed-effect estimations show positive and significant
coefficients on the loan indicator, demonstrating that weak-information loans are
associated with increases in Tobin’s Q.

This result offers further support for our

hypothesis that bank loans enhance firm value because of the monitoring that banks
perform.23
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that it is unlikely that our results are
explained by reverse causality or selection bias where only high-valued firms get loans. It
21

Other purposes identified with significant numbers of loans in the DealScan database
include general corporate, acquisition, capital expenditure, LBO, project finance, real
estate, recapitalization, takeover, trade finance, and other.
22 The loan typically involves a short-term revolving credit or letter of credit that the
borrower may draw upon should it find itself unable to roll over or otherwise refinance its
commercial paper coming due.
23 We would have liked to compare the effects of weak-information loans with stronginformation loans. However, among the categories of what we consider to be strong-
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is also unlikely that an omitted third variable is responsible both for firms’ obtaining loans
and for increases in Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the results indicate that the loan indicator is not
just a proxy for the existence of good projects, but that bank monitoring is at least partly
responsible for the positive correlation between loans and firm value. In a word, bank
monitoring enhances firm value.
C.

Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment

We have shown generally that bank monitoring improves firm value. Here we
investigate the value-enhancing prospects for bank monitoring in specific contexts
suggesting severe agency costs. Bank monitoring may be especially important in these
contexts. We first test the value of bank monitoring when firms have high free cash flow.
We then investigate bank monitoring in the presence of both high free cash flow and
management entrenchment.
1.

Interactions with Free Cash Flow

First, we explore the relationship between bank loans, free cash flow, and firm
value.

Free cash flow may increase the agency conflict between managers and

shareholders because managers may be tempted to spend free cash for their own benefit—
on perks or empire building, for example—rather than distribute it to shareholders (Jensen
(1986)).

The presence of a bank loan, however, may reduce these agency costs by

monitoring managers’ use of discretionary funds. In Table 5, controlling for entrenchment
with the G-index, we use interaction variables to determine whether the value of bank
monitoring is stronger in firms with higher free cash flow, which are subject to greater
potential agency costs.
Again, for our measure of free cash flow, we use operating income minus interest
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, scaled by the book value of
the firm’s assets. For estimations without interactions (col. A & B), the results indicate
that, controlling for entrenchment, the loan indicator has a positive relationship with

information loans—for example, capital expenditures, acquisitions, real estate, project
finance—the number of loans is insufficient to offer a meaningful comparison.
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Tobin’s Q, while free cash flow is not statistically significant. When we include the
interactions between the free cash flow and the loan indicator (col. C & D), the negative
coefficient on the independent free cash flow variable and the positive coefficient on the
interaction together suggest that (i) when bank monitoring exists to control agency costs of
free cash flow, free cash flow may improve firm value; but (ii) in the absence of bank
monitoring, the agency costs associated with free cash flow may reduce firm value.
Finally, the last two columns (col. E & F) indicate that the positive effect of bank
monitoring and free cash flow on firm value is even greater for firms with substantial cash
flow, or those in the top one-third of our sample in terms of free cash flow. Overall, our
results strongly suggest that bank monitoring interacts with free cash flow to enhance firm
value. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the value-enhancing effect of bank
monitoring may matter most where agency costs are high.
2.

Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment

Here, we explore the relationships among bank loans, free cash flow, management
entrenchment, and firm value. GIM (2003) and BCF (2005) have shown a negative
correlation between managerial entrenchment and firm value. We hypothesize that bank
monitoring may mitigate the value-decreasing effects of management entrenchment.
Banks’ continuing oversight of firms’ compliance with financial covenants and operating
and investment restrictions may constrain managers despite the slack that entrenchment
affords and the temptation that free cash flow presents. The results from Table 5 above
suggest that bank monitoring improves managers’ use of discretionary funds to increase
firm value. In Tables 6 and 7, we test for similar value-enhancing effects of bank loans,
now in the context of specific entrenchment arrangements. We test for the effects of free
cash flow on firm value for a given level of entrenchment, and then test to see whether the
presence of a loan affects this interaction of free cash flow and management entrenchment.
We use a series of interactions between bank loans, free cash flow, and measures of
management entrenchment. In Table 6, for our measures of entrenchment we use our two
governance indices—the G-index and E-index. In Table 7, we use the six individual
entrenchment provisions comprising the E-index.
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Our results in Table 6 support the findings of Table 5. We find that for a given
level of entrenchment, free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring improves firm
value. In columns A and B of Table 6, we see positive and significant coefficients on the
interaction of free cash flow and the G-index, indicating that for a given governance
quality, firm value increases with free cash flow.24 When we interact the loan indicator
with free cash flow and the G-index, we similarly find a positive and significant relation to
firm value.

This suggests that for a given governance quality (a given level of

entrenchment), free cash flow in the presence of bank monitoring may improve firm value.
We obtain similar results in columns C and D, where we use the E-index as our
entrenchment measure, though in the model with full controls, the coefficient is
insignificant.
For estimations reported in Table 7, we use similar interactions, except that instead
of a governance index, we interact using the six individual entrenchment provisions from
the E-index. Our results are largely consistent with those in Table 6. As to interactions
between free cash flow and individual entrenchment provisions, we find that firm value
increases with free cash flow, given the presence of any of the following: a poison pill, a
supermajority requirement for mergers, a staggered board, limits to bylaw amendments,
24

A recent empirical study by Chi and Lee (2005) finds evidence of a negative relationship
between firm value and the interaction between free cash flow and managerial
entrenchment. Our specification differs somewhat from theirs. In all of our estimations
reported in Tables 6 and 7, we consistently find a positive and significant relationship
between firm value and the interaction of free cash flow with our entrenchment measures.
However, when we run separate regressions for Loan Firms and non-Loan Firms,
we find a positive interaction between free cash flow and managerial entrenchment for
only the non-Loan Firms. For Loan Firms, we find a statistically significant negative
coefficient on the interaction between free cash flow and managerial entrenchment. As the
non-Loan Firms in our sample have higher mean firm value—as measured by industryadjusted Tobin’s Q—than the Loan Firms, these results are consistent with the idea that
free cash flow improves firm value for high-Q firms because those firms have good
projects in which to invest their cash (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1991). In contrast, for the
Loan Firms—with lower mean Q—free cash flow may represent the potential for
managerial abuse of discretionary funds. Consistent with this, when we split the sample of
firms in half based on whether they have above- or below-median Tobin’s Q, we find that
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and golden parachutes. Coefficients are positive and significant in each model, with and
without controls. Only limits on charter amendments have no statistically significant
interactive effect with free cash flow.

When we include the loan indicator in the

interaction, we find positive and statistically significant interactions in the presence of
staggered boards, poison pills (in the specification without the full set of controls), and
golden parachutes (in the specification without the full set of controls).25 These results
suggest that with any of these three entrenching provisions, free cash flow in the presence
of bank monitoring improves firm value.
3.

Strong Entrenchment: When Bank Monitoring May Matter Most

Why might bank monitoring have this value-enhancing effect with free cash flow
in the presence of these three entrenchment provisions, but not with the other entrenchment
provisions that also merit inclusion in the E-index? Again, it may be that bank monitoring
matters most in situations with high agency costs. These three provisions—staggered
boards, poison pills, and golden parachutes—have direct relevance for managerial slack
and entrenchment, while the others arguably do not.
Our estimations involving the staggered board offer our strongest results for the
value of bank monitoring. Consistent with our high agency cost theory, the corporate
governance literature recognizes the special potency of the staggered board as an
entrenching device.

(Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen

2005). As earlier mentioned, an effective staggered board prevents the timely ouster of a
majority of the firm’s board of directors, requiring even a majority of shareholders to wait
through at least two annual elections to accomplish the task.26 This delay in gaining

only the high-value firms show a positive interaction between free cash flow and
managerial entrenchment.
25 These results are consistent whether or not we include controls for other E-index
provisions besides the specific provision of interest in each model. Estimations with such
controls are not reported.
26 As earlier noted, a staggered board is most effective when the firm’s governance
arrangements do not permit shareholders to (a) effect amendments that unstagger the
board; (b) increase the number of board seats and fill them; or (c) remove directors without
28
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control of the firm strongly deters a proxy fight or other hostile takeover. Moreover,
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) offer empirical evidence suggesting that a staggered board
reduces firm value. Similarly, the poison pill has been recognized as another potent
entrenchment tool, especially when used in combination with a staggered board (Bebchuk,
Coates, and Subramanian 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005). A poison pill effectively
precludes a hostile acquirer from purchasing a block of the target’s stock above some
percentage threshold.27 It does this by diluting the value of the acquirer’s stock in the
target firm once the percentage threshold is reached.28 The standard maneuver to defeat a
pill is to obtain control of the board in order to redeem the pill. But an effective staggered
board prevents this approach. So together the pill and the staggered board offer very
strong entrenchment.
The golden parachute operates a bit differently from these other two devices in
increasing agency costs. A golden parachute promises incumbent managers a handsome
payout upon a change of control of the firm. The parachute in effect offers a soft landing
for ousted executives. Unlike other “entrenching” provisions, the parachute generates
agency costs for the opposite reason.

Rather than insulating management from the

takeover market and protecting managers’ jobs, the golden parachute eases their transition

cause. Our data do not distinguish among levels of effectiveness of staggered boards. This
only biases our sample against us, however.
27 Some have cautioned not to overrate the presence of a pill, since a firm without a pill can
always adopt one without shareholder approval, even in the face of a hostile bid. So even a
firm without a pill is protected by a “shadow pill” (Coates 2000). On the other hand,
whether a pill is in place or not may have a signaling effect to potential acquirers. A pill in
place may signal the board’s determination to fight any hostile bid, while the absence of a
pill—or the removal of an existing pill—may signal management’s “softness” to a
potential acquirer (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2005).
28 The dilution is effected by issuing rights to all stockholders to purchase securities—
typically of the target but sometimes of the acquirer—at steep discounts once the
acquirer’s stock holdings in the target exceed the specified percentage threshold. The
rights may be exercised by all stockholders except the unwanted acquirer.
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to unemployment. By reducing the sting of takeover market discipline, the parachute may
encourage managerial slack.29
By comparison, for the other three provisions of the E-index—supermajority voting
for mergers, limits to by-law amendments, and limits to charter amendments—the joint
interactions with free cash flow and the loan indicator in Table 7 produced no significant
results. This lack of results might be explained by the fact that these three provisions are
in some sense second-order entrenchment devices that do not by themselves directly
protect managers from hostile takeovers. Limits to by-law and charter amendments do not
directly enable managerial slack. Instead, they prevent shareholder modification of other
provisions—namely, staggered boards and poison pills—that do directly entrench
managers by shielding them from capital market discipline. Similarly, a supermajority
voting requirement for mergers seems of secondary importance for entrenchment purposes
because shareholders would only get to vote on a merger proposal after its approval by the
board. Therefore, a supermajority requirement would matter in a hostile takeover context
only if management lost control of the board—i.e., if the staggered board were ineffective
at preventing a loss of control. Supermajority requirements, then, offer only a “second line
of defense.” (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2005).
Free cash flow with strong entrenchment may present a situation where bank
monitoring matters most. Bank oversight of managers’ use of discretionary funds may add
the most value when agency costs are highest—when strong entrenchment would
otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our study is the first to integrate into the empirical corporate governance literature
a careful consideration of the effects of bank monitoring on agency cost reduction. Using
Tobin’s Q as our metric for firm value, as is standard in the corporate governance
literature, we find strong evidence that bank monitoring adds value. Controlling for the
G-index and for potential simultaneity, we find a positive and significant relation between

29

Of course, this may benefit shareholders to the extent it renders management more
amenable to a takeover (Kahan and Rock (2002)).
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firm value and the presence of a bank loan. In addition, using measures of free cash flow
to differentiate companies with high agency costs, we find that bank monitoring interacts
with free cash flow to enhance firm value. Finally, we investigate interactions among our
loan indicator, free cash flow, and various measures of governance quality. We show first
that, for a given quality of corporate governance, free cash flow in the presence of bank
monitoring improves firm value. Second, we differentiate among E-index provisions,
showing that bank monitoring may matter most when strong entrenchment would
otherwise encourage managers to squander free cash—i.e., when agency costs are high. In
effect, bank monitoring can counteract somewhat the value-decreasing effect of managerial
entrenchment. Bank monitoring may substitute for good corporate governance.
This finding has several important implications.

First, corporate governance

thinking must incorporate the effects of bank governance—and perhaps governance
provisions embedded in other types of contractual commitments as well. For example,
empirical studies of corporate governance may need to control for bank monitoring in
order to isolate the effects of traditional governance arrangements.

Studies typically

control for firm characteristics affecting measures of firm value but have generally ignored
the possibility that bank monitoring may also matter. Governance scholars have noted the
perils of studying particular governance devices in isolation from one another (Bebchuk
and Cohen 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2005). In the same way, investigating
traditional governance devices in isolation from bank governance may generate biased
results. Second, courts should tread lightly in promulgating legal doctrines tending to
impede banks from enforcing contractual governance provisions (Baird and Rasmussen
2006). Though doctrines like lender liability, equitable subordination, and deepening
insolvency tend to impose liability on lenders, if at all, in situations of financial distress,
the general discouragement of bank monitoring may have negative effects that carry well
beyond the financial distress context.
We have demonstrated that corporate governance may involve more than just
corporate law. Contracting parties may share an interest with shareholders in controlling
managerial agency costs. We show that bank monitoring may perform such a function
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even outside the confines of financial distress. Bank monitoring improves firm value in
general.
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TABLES
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
Entire Sample
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914229

Variable
Industry-Adjusted
Tobin’s Q

# of Obs.

Mean

Loan Firms Only
Standard
Deviation

# of Obs.

Mean

Non-Loan Firms Only

Standard
Deviation

# of Obs.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

22487

0.720

3.316

14470

0.546

2.199

8017

1.033

4.688

Loan Indicator

28335

0.373

0.484

17472

0.605

0.489

10863

0.000

0.000

G Index

17889

9.183

2.752

11923

9.349

2.757

5966

8.850

2.712

E Index

17889

2.153

1.307

11923

2.191

1.299

5966

2.079

1.321

Free Cash Flow

23337

0.092

0.183

15430

0.110

0.148

7907

0.057

0.234

Assets (in millions)

27886

6946.195

35947.88

17375

8214.022

43493.35

10511

4850.438

17158.770

Firm Age (in months)

28335

230.026

215.337

17472

254.798

224.330

10863

190.183

193.494

ROA

27866

0.014

0.237

17365

0.037

0.134

10501

-0.024

0.341

CAPEX/Assets

25553

0.062

0.064

16648

0.061

0.061

8905

0.063

0.069

Leverage

22860

0.436

0.249

14761

0.446

0.209

8099

0.417

0.308

R&D per Sales

14328

0.490

7.903

9095

0.101

1.014

5233

1.166

12.981
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Table 2.
Variable
Loan Indicator
G-index

Bank Loans and Firm Value
A
B
C
-0.065**
-0.088**
0.085***
-2.54
1.96
2.79
-0.055***
-12.82

-0.066***
-8.3

-0.039***
-3.8

D
0.151***
2.73
-0.041**
-2.05

Assets

0.000003
1.55

-.00001***
-3.25

Firm Age

-0.001***
-4.95

-0.001
-1.25

ROA

0.681***
6.51

0.847***
7.26

CAPEX/Assets

3.858***
8.13

2.579***
4.62

Leverage

-0.277***
-2.78

0.926***
7.37

R&D per Sales

0.031***
8.81

0.015***
5.08

Firm fixed effects?
no
no
yes
yes
Number of
Observations
13710
6711
13710
6711
R-squared
0.03
0.079
0.628
0.622
This table reports both pooled OLS regressions (first 2 columns) and regressions
with firm fixed effects (last 2 columns). The dependent variable in all
regressions is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is
equal to the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock minus
the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. We
compute the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by subtracting the median Tobin’s Q
in the industry from each firm’s Tobin’s Q, where industry is defined by twodigit SIC code. The loan indicator is equal to 1 for all years that firms had bank
loans for all 12 months. The G-index ranges from 0 to 24 to indicate the
entrenchment provisions of each firm. ROA is net income/assets.
CAPEX/Assets is capital expenditures/assets. R&D per Sales is research and
development expenditures/total sales. Leverage is total debt/assets. Although
not shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions.
T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are
indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 3.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=914229

Variable
Loan Indicator

A
0.09**
2.49

B
0.15**
2.41

Robustness Checks
C
D
E
0.09**
0.15**
0.09*
2.00
2.25
1.74

G-index

-0.04***
3.78

-0.04**
-2.11

-0.04***
-2.61

-0.04**
-2.00

-0.04**
-2.28

F
0.15*
1.67

G
0.10***
3.11

H
0.18***
3.05

-0.04
-1.37

-0.04***
-3.63

-0.05**
-2.16

Assets

.00001***
-2.70

0.000001
-1.46

0.00001
-1.42

.00001***
-4.73

Firm Age

0.00
-1.48

0.00
-1.28

0.00
-1.13

0.53
0.32

ROA

0.85***
3.69

0.85***
2.67

0.85***
3.07

0.86***
7.30

CAPEX/Assets

2.58***
3.52

2.58***
2.69

2.58***
2.79

2.71***
4.70

Leverage

0.93***
2.65

0.93**
2.44

0.93**
2.26

1.02***
7.63

R&D per Sales

0.02*
1.82

0.02
1.41

0.02
1.45

0.02***
5.03

# of Observations
R-squared

13694
0.628

6708
0.622

13694
0.628

6708
0.622

13694
0.628

6708
0.622

13694
0.652

6708
0.639
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Notes: This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We
describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2.
Columns A and B report estimations with t-statistics computed from robust standard errors; columns C and D report
estimations with t-statistics computed from standard errors clustered by industry; columns E and F report estimations with
t-statistics computed from standard errors clustered by firm; and columns G and H show the results of estimations that
include industry-specific year effects. Although not shown in the tables, year and firm dummies are included in all
regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 4.
Variable
Loan Indicator
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Industry-Adj. Tobin’s
Q in Year before
Loan
G-index

A
0.047
1.56

-0.025**
-2.22

Bank Loans and Firm Value: Exploring Potential Simultaneity
B
C
D
E
F
G
0.125**
2.38

-0.01
-0.46

0.036
1.14

-0.03***
-2.67

0.1*
1.75

0.062
1.61

-0.016
-0.77

-.036**
-2.43

0.142**
2.12

-0.04
-1.44

H

I

J

0.092***
3.00

0.155***
2.78

0.188***
3.82

0.281***
3.08

-0.025*
-1.83

-0.01
-0.52

-.039***
-3.78

-0.041**
-2.04

-0.046***
-3.29

-0.06***
-2.19

-.00001***
-2.79

-.00001***
-3.09

-.00002***
-5.07

-.00001***
-3.23

-.00001***
-2.62

Firm Age

-0.001
-0.79

-0.001
-0.74

0.001
0.79

-0.001
-1.25

-0.001
-1.55

ROA

2.62***
13.05

2.47***
12.04

2.592***
10.49

0.848***
7.27

0.568
4.18***

CAPEX/Assets

1.294**
2.01

0.795
1.25

0.857
1.09

2.584***
4.63

3.663
5.05

Leverage

-0.316
-1.6

-0.334*
-1.69

-0.197
-0.79

0.926***
7.37

1.008
6.81

R&D per Sales

-0.001
-0.01

-0.009
-0.1

-0.6
-1.34

0.015***
5.08

0.01***
3.29

Assets

All Firms / Loan
Firms only?
Entire period / Before
loan / After loan?
# of Observations
R-squared

Loan
Firms

Loan
Firms

Loan
Firms

Loan
Firms

Loan
Firms

Loan
Firms

All
Firms

All Firms

See
notes

See
notes

Entire

Entire

Before

Before

After

After

Entire

Entire

Entire

Entire

9529
0.628

4575
0.638

9042
0.646

4277
0.66

7050
0.659

3519
0.656

13710
0.628

6711
0.622

9201
0.64

4484
0.627
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Notes: This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculation of
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table 2. Columns A and B report estimations where the sample
includes only firms that have loans during our sample period. Columns C and D report estimations on only the Loan Firms and only comparing the
period before the loan with the period during the loan. Columns E and F report estimations on only the Loan Firms and only comparing the loan period
with the period following the loan’s retirement. Columns G and H report estimations on all firms, but controlling for Tobin’s Q in the year before firms
get bank loans. In columns I and J, our sample includes only firm-years where either (a) the firm has no loan; or (b) the firm’s only loan(s) are for
working capital, debt repayment, or commercial paper backup purposes, which are generally unrelated to the financing of good projects. The loan
indicator is equal to 1 for only the years that a firm had such a bank loan. Although not shown in the tables, year and firm dummies are included in all
regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 5.
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow
Variable
Loan Indicator

Free Cash Flow

A
0.087***
2.81

B
0.149***
2.7

C
-0.273***
-6.84

D
-0.23***
-3.24

E
-0.243***
-6.07

F
-0.194***
-2.74

-0.122
-1.54

-0.348
-1.55

-0.458***
-5.57

-0.926***
-3.97

-0.443***
-5.4

-0.891***
-3.84

3.075***
14.01

3.398***
8.4

1.624***
5.61

1.544***
3.09

1.884***
7.65

2.739***
6.3

-0.036***
-3.51

-0.034*
-1.7

Loan Indicator * Free
Cash Flow
Loan Indicator * Free
Cash Flow * Top 1/3
G-index

-0.037***
-3.59

Assets

-0.037*
-1.86

-0.037***
-3.59

-0.036*
-1.82

-.00001***
-3.5

-.00001***
-3.74

-.00001***
-3.83

-.0004
-0.62

-.0003
-0.48

-.0003
-0.54

ROA

1.163***
6.95

1.18***
7.1

1.188***
7.17

CAPEX/Assets

2.957***
5.16

2.648***
4.65

2.446***
4.3

Leverage

0.891***
5.99

0.697***
4.67

0.72***
4.83

R&D per Sales

0.016***
4.24

0.009***
2.41

0.01**
2.51

Firm Age

Firm fixed effects?

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Number of Observations
12833
6359
12833
6359
12833
6359
R-squared
0.637
0.629
0.643
0.633
0.645
0.636
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We
describe the calculation of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, along with the definitions of other control variables, in Table
2. We add free cash flow measures to the estimations reported in this table, where our measure of free cash flow is
calculated as operating income minus the sum of the following components: a) total income taxes minus the change in
deferred taxes from the previous year to the current year, b) gross interest expenses on debt, c) dividend payments on
preferred stocks, and d) dividend payments on common stocks. This is divided by the firm’s book value of assets.
Columns A and B report estimations including the free cash flow measure; columns C and D add an interaction
between free cash flow and the loan indicator; columns E and F add an additional interaction term between the loan
indicator, free cash flow, and an indicator variable for firms with free cash flow in the top 1/3 of our sample. Although
not shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient
estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 6.
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Governance Indices
Variable
Loan Indicator

A
-0.145***
-3.54

B
-0.055***
-0.74

C
0.01
0.28

D
0.117*
1.75

Free Cash Flow

-2.011***
-6.94

-2.692***
-4.92

-0.726***
-8.1

-1.122***
-4.73

G-index

-0.073***
-6.58

-0.072***
-3.41

Free Cash Flow * G-index

0.243***
5.81

0.284***
3.83

Free Cash Flow *
G-index * Loan Indicator

0.209***
8.52

0.189***
4.18

E-index

-0.166***
-8.48

-0.17***
-4.36

Free Cash Flow * E-index

0.759***
11.25

0.973***
8.08

Free Cash Flow *
E-index * Loan Indicator

0.286***
3.38

0.132
0.82

Assets

-.00001***
-3.75

-.00001***
-3.83

-.0003
-0.53

-.00032
-0.52

ROA

1.182***
7.1

1.068***
6.42

CAPEX/Assets

2.694***
4.72

2.607***
4.58

Leverage

0.626***
4.11

0.444***
2.86

R&D per Sales

0.012***
3.01

0.015***
3.82

Firm Age

Firm fixed effects?
Number of Observations
R-squared

yes

yes

yes

yes

12833
0.643

6359
0.633

12833
0.643

6359
0.635
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This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q. We describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, free cash flow, and the other
control variables in Table 2. This table reports estimations that include interactions between free cash flow
and two governance indices (the G-index and E-index) and among free cash flow, the governance indices,
and the loan indicator. In columns A & B, the governance index is GIM’s G-index. In columns C & D, the
governance index is BCF’s E-index. Although not shown in the tables, year dummies are included in all
regressions. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **,
and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 7.
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchment Provisions
A

B

C

D

E

F

-0.008
-0.23

0.112*
1.74

0.078**
2.44

0.153***
2.67

0.017
0.48

0.07
1.07

Free Cash Flow

-0.624***
-7.2

-1.044***
-4.45

-0.177**
-2.18

-0.432*
-1.91

-0.645***
-7.36

-0.952***
-4.09

Poison Pill

-0.524***
-12.1

-0.546***
-7.0

2.16***
10.61

2.716***
7.94

1.258***
4.98

0.49
1.07
-0.121
-1.49

-0.228
-1.44

1.133***
2.87

2.235***
2.66

0.402
0.87

-0.124
-0.14

Staggered Board

-0.34***
-4.91

-0.168
-1.11

Free Cash Flow *
Staggered Board

2.29***
11.07

2.61***
7.27

0.911***
3.57

1.055**
2.18

yes
No

yes
Yes

Variable
Loan Indicator

Free Cash Flow *
Poison Pill
Free Cash Flow *
Poison Pill * Loan Indicator
Supermajority for merger

Free Cash Flow *
Supermajority
Free Cash Flow *
Supermajority * Loan Indicator

Free Cash Flow *
Staggered Board * Loan Indicator
Firm fixed effects?
Full set of Controls
Number of Observations

yes
No

yes
Yes

yes
No

yes
Yes

12833
6359
12833
6359
12833
6359
R-squared
0.644
0.635
0.637
0.629
0.643
0.634
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We
describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2.
This table reports estimations that include interactions between free cash flow and the three entrenchment provisions
and among free cash flow, the entrenchment provisions, and the loan indicator. Although not shown in the tables, year
dummies are included in all regressions. The full set of controls found in Tables 2 – 6 are included in the estimations
reported in columns B, D, and F, but omitted for brevity. T-statistics appear below the coefficient estimates.
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 7. (continued)
Bank Loans and Firm Value: Interactions with Free Cash Flow and Entrenchment Provisions
A

B

C

D

E

F

0.089***
2.81

0.153***
2.72

0.087***
2.79

0.151***
2.7

0.051
1.48

0.137**
2.21

Free Cash Flow

-0.223***
-2.72

-0.422*
-1.88

-0.127
-1.59

-0.342
-1.52

-0.472***
-5.51

-0.836***
-3.52

Limits to Amend Bylaws

-0.336***
-4.37

-0.442***
-2.98

Free Cash Flow *
Limits to Amend Bylaws

1.514***
4.69

2.278***
4.25

-0.239
-0.59

-0.32
-0.36

Limits to Amend Charter

-0.145
-0.91

0.011
0.03

Free Cash Flow *
Limits to Amend Charter

0.88
0.9

0.709
0.34

-0.053
-0.05

-0.594
-0.21

Golden Parachute

-0.236***
-6.04

-0.192***
-2.63

Free Cash Flow *
Golden Parachute

1.701***
8.46

2.089***
5.32

Free Cash Flow *
Golden Parachute * Loan Indicator

0.498**
1.99

0.194
0.39

yes
No

yes
Yes

Variable
Loan Indicator

Free Cash Flow * Limits
to Amend Bylaws * Loan Indicator

Free Cash Flow * Limits
to Amend Charter * Loan Indicator

Firm fixed effects?
Full set of Controls
Number of Observations

yes
No

yes
Yes

yes
No

yes
Yes

12833
6359
12833
6359
12833
6359
R-squared
0.637
0.63
0.636
0.628
0.64
0.631
This table reports regressions with firm fixed effects where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. We
describe the calculations of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, free cash flow, and the other control variables in Table 2.
This table reports estimations that include interactions between free cash flow and the three entrenchment provisions
and between free cash flow, the entrenchment provisions, and the loan indicator. Although not shown in the tables,
year dummies are included in all regressions. The full set of controls found in Tables 2 – 6 are included in the
estimations reported in columns B, D, and F, but omitted for brevity. T-statistics appear below the coefficient
estimates. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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